Oil spill preparedness in the Baltic Sea countries by Pålsson, Jonas
World Maritime University
The Maritime Commons: Digital Repository of the World
Maritime University
Baltic Master II Project Reports
1-2012
Oil spill preparedness in the Baltic Sea countries
Jonas Pålsson
World Maritime University, jp@wmu.se
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.wmu.se/baltic_master2
Part of the Emergency and Disaster Management Commons, and the International and Area
Studies Commons
This Report Open Access is brought to you courtesy of Maritime Commons. Open Access items may be downloaded for non-commercial, fair use
academic purposes. No items may be hosted on another server or web site without express written permission from the World Maritime University. For
more information, please contact library@wmu.se.
Recommended Citation
Pålsson, Jonas, "Oil spill preparedness in the Baltic Sea countries" (2012). Baltic Master II. 3.
http://commons.wmu.se/baltic_master2/3
Oil spill preparedness in the Baltic 
Sea countries
Report written for the Baltic Master II project 
by Jonas Pålsson, World Maritime University.
Index
......................................................................................................Abstract! 4
................................................................................................Introduction! 5
...........................................................................................................The Baltic Sea! 5
...............................................................................................Commercial interests! 5
....................................................................................................................Shipping! 7
....................................................................................................................Oil spills! 8
.......................................................................................................................Effects! 9
.........................................................................................................................Cost! 10
...........................................................................................Contingency planning! 10
.......................................................................................Response preparedness! 10
...................................................................................Regulations and strategies! 11
..................................................................................................Current initiatives! 11
.............................................................................Material and methods! 11
.....................................................................................................Results ! 12
.................................................................................................................Denmark! 12
....................................................................................................................Estonia! 14
....................................................................................................................Finland! 15
.................................................................................................................Germany! 17
.......................................................................................................................Latvia! 19
.................................................................................................................Lithuania! 20
.....................................................................................................................Poland! 21
................................................................................................Russian Federation! 23
....................................................................................................................Sweden! 24
.................................................................................................Aerial surveillance! 26
.....................................................................................International conventions! 27
..................................................................................................Previous oil spills! 27
2
...............................................................................................Discussion! 30
...............................................................................................Conclusion! 32
...............................................................................................References ! 34
....................................................Appendix 1: Contacts for the inquiry! 36
..................Appendix 2: Oil Spill Response Vessels in the Baltic Sea! 37
3
Abstract
The Baltic Sea is one of the world’s busiest waterways. An estimated 9 % of the world’s trade and 
11 % of the world’s oil transportation passes through Baltic waters. It is estimated that this will 
increase by  64 % between 2003 and 2020. For example, the oil transportation has increased by 133 
% between 1997 and 2008 and is now over 250 million tonnes per year. Plenty  of shallows and 
narrow passages make parts of the Baltic Sea difficult to navigate. There are around 130 accidents 
each year, with 10 of these leading to pollution, mostly of oil. The brackish water of the Baltic Sea 
coupled with a long residence time of water, makes the flora and fauna particularly  sensitive to 
pollution. The Baltic Sea countries are fortunate to never have had a larger oil spill. The largest one, 
the Globe Asimi in Lithuania in 1981 spilled 16 000 tonnes of oil. Compared to the larger oils spills 
in other parts of the world, for example the Prestige, that spilled 63 000 tonnes, this is a small 
amount.
In the Baltic Sea region, several bilateral agreements and international conventions exist to 
strengthen the cross border cooperation in case of an oil spill. Annual exercises are held by the 
respective countries’ Navy  and Coast Guard on combatting oil spills at  sea. These have held 
multiple joint response operations during the HELCOM Balex Delta exercises for several years. 
However, this spirit of international cooperation and capacity building has not been the case with 
the land based oil spill response.
The organisation of the on land oil spill response in the Baltic Sea countries varies. Certain 
countries have a centralised system, with a federal authority in charge of the response and aided by 
local resources. Other countries have the local authorities in charge, who are aided by the 
governmental authorities and resources.
Different countries have worked with contingency  planning to a varying degree. Poland for 
example have had no larger spills at all, but have invested much time and money into response 
preparedness. Sweden has had several smaller to medium sized spills, but there is large variation 
between the municipalities concerning the preparedness level. Different nations have set different 
goals for their oil spill response as well, for example Finland is prepared for an oil spill of 30 000 
tonnes, Germany for 15 000 tonnes, Sweden 10 000 tonnes and the Russian Federation for 5 000 
tonnes.
The two Baltic Master projects have highlighted the changing patterns related to shipping in the 
Baltic Sea and the corresponding need to continuously re-assess the threats to coastal environments 
and communities. One of the important conclusions from Baltic Master II is that  the preparedness to 
deal effectively with oil spills at the local and regional level in most  of the Baltic Sea countries is 
poorly developed. Important aspects are related to the need for updated and well rehearsed 
contingency  plans. The need to test these plans in real exercises with regular intervals must be 
emphasised in particular. Such practices will test the collaboration between different agencies 
locally, the cooperation between central and local agencies, and the collaboration across borders. To 
cover the cost for such an improved preparedness various funding mechanisms can be discussed, 
one example highlighted in the present report is the development of a fund similar to the Finnish 
model.
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Introduction
The increased maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea in the last  decade has fundamentally  changed the 
needs for response preparedness for a major oil spill accident in the adjacent countries. Larger 
tankers and more oil being transported through the Baltic Sea have also changed the risk factors of 
the region. Coupled with anticipated development of both coastlines and the sea, many reports are 
calling for a holistic approach to marine spatial planning. Efforts in this direction have already been 
made, with the European Union’s (EU’s) Integrated Maritime Policy and Baltic Sea Strategy and 
Helsinki Commission’s (HELCOM’s) Baltic Sea Action Plan. (Boverket, 2006; HELCOM, 2010a; 
EU, 2009 & 2010 and WWF, 2010)
This report  has been written for the EU project Baltic Master II. During the project, several 
contingency  plans have been written for coastal municipalities in the south Baltic Sea. Additionally, 
exercises has been held in these municipalities to increase the familiarity with the written plans and 
to make all participants understand the need for a plan. This has also led to an awareness rising for 
the topic in the region.
The purpose of this report is to describe how the different countries around the Baltic Sea have 
formed their oil spill preparedness and to identify possible weaknesses that need to be addressed. 
The Baltic Sea
The Baltic Sea covers around 377 000 km² and is one of the largest brackish water bodies in the 
world. It is located in the northeast part of the Atlantic, connected through first  Skagerrak, then 
Kattegat and finally the Danish Belt straits and the Öresund, between Denmark and Sweden. It is 
divided into the Baltic Proper, the Gulf of Finland, the Bothnian Sea and the Bothnian Bay (see 
figure 1). It  has a shoreline to nine different countries; Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden. All of these countries, except Russia, are part of the EU. 
Around 85 million people live in the catchment area of the Baltic Sea, most of them in the southern 
half. Besides the nine countries mentioned before, another five countries (Belarus, Czech Republic, 
Norway, Slovakia and Ukraine) contribute to the runoff into the Baltic Sea. (HELCOM, 2011b)
In addition to being one of the world’s largest brackish seas, it is also very  shallow. The average 
depth is only 56 meters and the deepest point, Landsortsdjupet, reaches 459 meters. The lighter, less 
saline water from the Baltic Sea is transported as a surface flow out through the Belt  Straits and 
Öresund. Heavier, more saline water flows close to the bottom into the Baltic Sea. These significant 
in-flows only happen when persistent strong westerly winds prevail, historically  once every  10-20 
years. The limited influx of oxygenated saline water, the lack of mixing across the halocline and the 
large input of nutrients and organic matter from the drainage area has led to eutrophication of the 
Baltic Sea. This has led to severe oxygen depletion over significant portions of the bottom. The lack 
of oxygen prevents any form of higher life, resulting in lifeless deepwater areas in 40 % of the 
Baltic Sea. (Elmgren, 2001; Bernes, 2005; HELCOM, 2009; Havsmiljöinstitutet, 2011)
Commercial interests 
All forms of tourism in the Baltic Sea countries, including that not related to the Baltic Sea, is 
estimated to turn over 90 billion euros per year. This gives employment to around 2 million persons. 
If you value different sectors, for example the pleasure boat  industry including service, wharfs and 
marinas, this turned over 265 million euros in Sweden alone in 2004. The Swedish sport fishing 
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Figure 1: The Baltic Sea, surrounding countries and drainage area (HELCOM, 2011b).
industry with around 1 million practitioners in seas and inland waters was estimated to turn over 
265 million euros in 2006. In addition to this, the recreational diving industry has around 235 000 
practitioners in Sweden (Naturvårdsverket, 2009). It is much harder to set a price on the value of a 
healthy sea and clean beaches in relation to the human health and non-market factors, such as 
recreational factors (Baltic Master II, 2011). 
The Baltic sea is also getting increasingly crowded with other kinds of commercial interests. The 
laying of the gas pipe from Russia to Germany is hindering the shipping, while the finished gas line 
will decrease the transportation of gas by ship. A report in 2010 from WWF estimates the wind 
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farms to increase by 6 000 % within the next ten years, which will drastically  change the shipping 
routes, depending on where these wind farms are erected. (WWF, 2010)
Shipping
The Baltic Sea is one of the most heavily  trafficked seas in the world with around 2 000 vessels 
sailing its waters at  any given moment. Up to 15 % of the worlds trade is transported on the Baltic 
Sea and 11 % of the world’s oil transport. Given the size of the Baltic basin, this makes the Baltic 
Sea one of the busiest seas in the world. The amount of oil being transported has doubled between 
1997 and 2008 and forecasts indicate that both the amount of traffic and the number of tankers will 
increase in the future (see figure 2). The size of the vessels is predicted to increase as well since the 
Russian oil terminals in the Primorsk area recently have been expanded to accommodate tankers 
carrying 150 000 tonnes of oil. With the growing demand for oil in the world and the opening of 
new oil fields in Russia west of the Ural, the increase of oil and gas transport through the Baltic Sea 
will increase even further in the coming years. With denser ship traffic and more and larger tankers, 
the risk of accidents resulting in oil spills is increasing (HELCOM, 2011a; Sergev et al., 2009).
Figure 2: Amount of oil being transported through the 16 largest oil terminals in the Baltic Sea (HELCOM, 
2011a).
Compared to European waters in general the Baltic Sea is overrepresented when it  comes to 
maritime accidents. About 120 to 140 are reported every year and there has been an 20 % increase 
since 2006 (see figure 3). Considering the heavy traffic, this is not  surprising at all. The shallow, 
narrow Danish and Swedish straits connecting the Baltic with the North Sea are known bottlenecks 
and notoriously difficult to navigate. Most of the groundings occur in this area, while the collisions 
that occur are spread more or less evenly  along the trade routes in the Baltic (HELCOM, 2011a; 
2009c).
Groundings in the Baltic Sea 
are more likely than collisions
The outcome of the overall risk assessment within 
the Project ‘Sub-regional risk of spill of oil and 
hazardous substances in the Baltic Sea’ (BRISK 
Project) as well as BRISK-RU Project (www.brisk.
helcom.fi ) shows that the likelihood of grounding 
accidents is about ten times higher than the ship-
to-ship collisions.
In 2000–2009, 7% of the reported accidents 
resulted in some kind of pollution. In 2009, this 
fi gure was slightly higher at 10%, with 10 out of 
the total 105 reported accidents resulting in pol-
lution. One of these incidents was a collision and 
one caused by machinery damage; the rest were 
pollution incidents occurring, for example, during 
fuel transfer. Vessels involved in pollution acci-
dents in 2009 were two cargo ships, two tankers 
and nine other vessels.
Cargo vessels are the main group of ships 
involved in the total number of accidents (28%), 
followed by passenger vessels (26%) and tankers 
(19%). Tankers were involved in approximately a 
fi fth of all accidents. Human factor was the main 
cause of accidents in over a half (52%) of the 
incidents reported in 2009. External and technical 
factors were the reason for 15% and 20% of the 
cases, respectively.
The Baltic Sea today is one of the busiest seas 
in the world, accounting for around 9% of total 
cargo and 11% of oil transportation in world 
traffi c. According to the AIS data, vessels entered 
or left the Baltic Sea via Skaw 62,700 times in 
2009. This number has increased by more than 
20% since 2006. Approximately 46% of these 
ships were cargo vessels, 21% were tankers and 
4.5% were passenger ships. There are about 
2,000 ships in the Baltic marine area at any given 
moment, and each month some 3,500–5,000 
ships ply the waters of the Baltic.
Forecasts indicate that due to economic growth, 
especially in the eastern part of the region, the 
maritime transport in the Baltic is expected to 
grow by 64% between 2003 and 2020. The 
amount of cargo shipped on the Baltic in 2008 
was 822 million tonnes, with the fastest annual 
growth taking place in Russia. The transportation 
of oil and other potentially hazardous cargoes is 
growing steeply and steadily. In 2009, more than 
251 million tonnes of oil were shipped on the 
Baltic (Figure 9). The use of much bigger tankers 
is also expected to rise – there will be more 
tankers in the Baltic carrying 100,000–150,000 
tonnes of oil.
Figure 10. Risk of accidents in the Baltic Sea area: collisions on 
route (red); in intersections (blue); and groundings (yellow).
Figure 9. Amount of oil transported via the 16 largest oil 
 terminals in the Baltic Sea during 1997, and 2000-2008.
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Figure 3: Number of accidents in the Baltic Sea and number of cases that have led to an oil spill (HELCOM, 
2011a).
Oil spills
One serious ecological impact of a shipping accident is pollution. Most of the time, this pollution 
comes from oil. According to data from ITOPF, the number of large oil spill accidents in the world 
are going down (see figure 4). Groundings and collisions remain the primary causes of oil spills, 
with groundings the largest of the two. With the ever increasing precision of sea charts, satellite 
tracking and technology on board the ships, this points to the fact that the primary cause ultimately 
lies with the human factor. (ITOPF, 2011 & HELCOM, 2011a) 
The fact that many of the oil tankers are old, and that single hull tankers are not yet phased out 
despite the MARPOL ban in 2010, adds to this risk. The oil tanker Prestige which sank off Spain’s 
Galician coast  in 2002, had passed through the Baltic Sea on its journey south. Once in the stormy 
waters of the Biscaya, the ship  was damaged in the heavy seas, broke into two and sunk. 
Approximately  63 000 tonnes of oil were spilled, contaminating 1 900 km of the Spanish, French 
and British coastlines (ITOPF, 2010a). The Fu Shan Hai accident in 2003 increased the awareness 
of the threats of oil spills in the Baltic Sea. The Fu Shan Hai spilled approximately 1 200 tonnes of 
oil, which is a small volume in comparison with other international oil spills during the last 10 
years. Had the Prestige wrecked in the Baltic Sea instead of the Bay of Biscay, extensive coastlines 
would have been contaminated. 
There has been a number of relatively  small accidents earlier in the Baltic Sea; one of the best 
documented is the Tsesis oil spill in the Stockholm archipelago in 1977. The accident which was a 
grounding resulted in a spill of approximately  1 000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil. The research after that 
incident and the information gathered in subsequent Baltic Sea oil spills have significantly 
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3 Overview of accidents in the Baltic Sea 
 
According to the reports from the Contracting States there were 124 ship accidents in the 
HELCOM area in 2010 (Figure 7), which is 19 more than the year before (increase of 18%) 
and 11 less than in 2008 (decrease of 8%). 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
The spatial distribution of the reported accidents in 2010 is presented in Figure 8. As can be 
noted, almost all accidents occurred very close to shore or in harbours. 
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improved understanding of the fate and impacts of oil spills in the region (Lindén et al, 1979; 
Midbøe & Petersson, 2004).
 
OIL TANKER SPILL STATISTIC 2010 3  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1970's 1980's 1990's 2000's
Nu
m
be
ro
fs
pi
lls
>700tonnes
7Ͳ700tonnes
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
N
um
be
ro
fS
pi
lls
1970Ͳ79:
25.3spills
peryearon
average
1980Ͳ89:
9.3spillsper
yearon
average
1990Ͳ99:
7.9spills
peryearon
average
2000Ͳ09:
3.3spills
peryearon
average
Figure 2: Number of large spills (over 700 tonnes) from 1970 to 2010 
 Figure 3: Number of medium (7-700 tonnes) and large (> 700 tonnes) spills per decade from 1970 to 2010 
QUANTITIES OF OIL SPILT 
 
The vast majority of spills are small (i.e. less than 7 tonnes) and data on numbers and amounts is incom-
plete due to the inconsistent reporting of smaller incidents worldwide.  
 
Reports on spills of 7 tonnes and above tend to be more reliable and information from these is included in 
the database to give a series of annual estimates of the total quantity spilled for the years 1970-2010. 
These amounts are rounded to the nearest thousand where practical. 
 
Approximately 5.71 million tonnes of oil were lost as a result of tanker incidents from 1970 to 2010. How-
ever, as Figure 4 indicates, the volume of oil spilt from tankers demonstrates a significant improvement 
through the decades. Consistent with the reduction in the number of oil spills from tankers, the volume of oil 
spilt also shows a marked reduction. For instance, from Table 2 it is interesting to observe that an amount 
greater than the total quantity of oil spilt between 2000 to 2009 (212,000 tonnes) was spilt in several single 
years in earlier decades. 
 
The total amount of oil lost to the environment in 2010, whilst more than that of 2008 and 2009, is signifi-
cantly lower than the average of oil lost in previous decades. Furthermore, at 10,000 tonnes this is the 
fourth lowest annually recorded figure (Table 2 and Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Number of spills in the ITOPF datab se from 1970 to 2010. (ITOPF, 2011)
The numbers also show that a far larger amount of oil is spilled in smaller quantities during routine 
operations. Much of the press coverage, however, is focussed on the impact accidents with a larger 
amount of oil spilled has on the environment. As stated before, studies have shown that there is very 
little long term effect after a larger oil spill. In contrast, long time chronic spills are far worse, as 
can be shown in areas like Nigeria. (UNEP, 2011)
Effects
The effects of oil on marine ecosystems have been extensively researched and much more is now 
known, than was the case when the first oil tanker, the Torrey Canyon, sunk in 1967. There have 
been two oil spill accidents especially, which have raised the concern of the public of what effects 
an oil spill has on the environment. The first was the Exxon Valdez in 1989 in Alaska, USA. The 
second was Prestige of the Galician coast in Spain in 2002.
All types of vessels carry fuel for their engines. Even ships with the latest technology and safety 
measures that adhere to all international safety standards run the risk of causing accidents 
potentially resulting in oil spills. So far, the Baltic Sea has been spared major spills, like the 
infamous Exxon Valdez or Prestige. The largest oil spill in the Baltic Sea was the Globe Asimi 
outside Klaipėda in Lithuania 1981. In total, approximately  16 000 tonnes of oil was spilled as a 
result of that incident (Midbøe & Petersson, 2004).
e environment will alway  be th  primary  victim after an oil spill. Birds are the animal that are 
most visibly affected, but fish, marine mammals and vertebrates are also affected. The vegetation is 
contaminated, and the oil seeps down into the ground where it  can continue to leak back to the 
surface for years. Although the cute effects can be fatal, the lo g-term non-let al effects are harder 
to ascertain. Most studies show that the environment will recover after a few years, but long-term 
9
impacts may be observed, such as reproductive and behavioural effects, shifts in population 
structure and habitat loss (ITOPF, 2010b; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 2004).
Cost
The socioeconomic cost of an oil spill has been estimated and discussed in several reports, among 
them the Baltic Master report Socioeconomic impacts of major oil spills - prediction methods and 
scenario studies from 2007. This report showed that  the cost of socio-economic damage can be 
expected to be more than twice the direct response and clean up costs (Baltic Master, 2007 & Baltic 
Master II, 2011).
The clean up cost of the Exxon Valdez was estimated to be approximately €1.8 billion during the 
first year alone. Claims, fines and penalties have been estimated to be €5.2 billion. Far from all the 
claims have been settled, and court processes are still pending, over 20 years after the spill. The 
same can be said of the Prestige. The cost of the damage was estimated to reach €1 billion not 
including the damage to the ecosystem. Only a small fraction of this has been compensated for, and 
the legal processes are still ongoing (IOPC, 2009; ITOPF, 2010c; 2010d). BP has as of 13 January 
2011 paid out close to $5 billion in claims for the Deepwater Horizon accident to individuals, 
industry and government (BP, 2011). This spill did not originate from a tanker but the impacts of the 
oil to the environment are similar.
The direct clean up cost of an oil spill is not necessarily related to the amount of oil spilled. There 
are various of factors that play  significant roles for the final cost. Among these are location of the 
spill, prevailing currents, distance to the shore, how fast and effective the response is and 
accessibility to the accident site. If the clean-up  is mostly performed out to sea, the cost is cut 
dramatically (Yamada, 2009).
 
Contingency planning
Contingency planning means to plan ahead for a future accident. By  establishing a work flow and 
assign tasks in advance, an organisation can test different scenarios and foresee bottlenecks and 
problems that will be problematic in a real incident. Hopefully, all the questions that will arise 
during the planning process will be addressed in time for a real incident. Most importantly, there is 
a need to exercise the plan, to see whether it works or not.
Response preparedness
Response preparedness of the Baltic Sea countries is in various stages of development. There are 
several conventions and agreements (for example HELCOM, BRISK and the Copenhagen 
agreement) regulating cooperation across borders and between organisations. Experience shows that 
almost all marine oil spills will to some degree affect land. The problem with the existing plans, 
conventions and agreements is that they are too focused on the oil spills while they are at sea. Very 
little planning relates to the oil once it has reached the shoreline. Furthermore, the development of 
shoreline clean up technology has been very  limited during the last decades (ITOPF, 2007) Several 
experts agree that greater effectiveness of the oil spill response can be achieved with preparation 
(Kirby & Law, 2010).
Accordingly, HELCOM has recently  shifted its focus from seaward towards shoreline response to 
oil spills. For the first time in 2010, shoreline response was made an integral part of the annual 
Balex Delta exercise. In addition, oiled wildlife response has been developed, together with further 
recommendations added to the HELCOM response manual (HELCOM, 2010b).
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Regulations and strategies
One of the oldest and most respected organisations working in this area is HELCOM. It  is the 
governing body of the "Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea 
Area," commonly known as the Helsinki Convention of 1974 and 1992, the first regional 
convention to address the Baltic Sea (HELCOM, 2010a).
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973/1978, or MARPOL, 
is the international treaty covering the prevention of operational or accidental pollution of the 
marine environment by ships. It  is a combination of two treaties and updated by amendments 
through the years. 98 % of the world’s tonnage is signatory  to MARPOL Annex I and II (IMO, 
2002).
UNCLOS is the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 1982 and is widely  recognised 
as the constitution of the oceans. UNCLOS has been ratified by  a majority of the UN’s member 
states. The treaty deals with a multitude of issues in maritime and marine affairs, including 
accidents resulting in discharges of hazardous substances into the oceans (UN, 2010).
The European Union (EU) has recently approved their Baltic Sea Strategy, which outlines a 
comprehensive strategy for the economic development and environmental protection of the Baltic 
Sea area, The aim is to improve the economy in a sustainable way, while improving the 
environment (EU, 2010a).
Current initiatives
There are several on-going projects to increase the preparedness in the Baltic Sea, by creating or 
updating contingency planning as well as testing them in exercises. These can be local projects, but 
also international initiatives, for example EU projects or through organisations such as HELCOM. 
A few examples are the Baltic Master II, BRISK and EnSaCo EU projects.
Material and methods
Data has been collected by sending out inquiries over email to identified individuals within the 
respective countries’ emergency response organisations from Marcus Olsson at Region Skåne in 
Sweden. The individuals have been chosen from personal contacts and recommendations gathered 
during the course of the Baltic Master II project by Jonas Pålsson and Marcus Olsson and followed 
up with emails and telephone calls to clarify specific points in the answers. It was compiled by 
Jonas Pålsson and Marcus Olsson and written by Jonas Pålsson. Supplementary  information has 
been collected from the respective organisation’s web pages.
The initial emails specifically inquired about:
Responsible authorities
- Who is responsible for what?
- To whom do they answer?
Response chain
- Who gets the first alert?
- Who does he call?
- How is he response initiated from the alert?
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Equipment
- What type of equipment is available?
- Who has it?
- Where is it?
Previous accidents
- Have there been any accidents before?
- Where have they been?
- How much was spilled?
- What was the result of the response?
Exercises
- How often do you exercise?
- With whom do you exercise?
Conventions ratified
- What international conventions are ratified by each country?
- Which conventions are not ratified?
The contact persons for the different countries are shown in Appendix 1.
Results
The preparedness situation around the Baltic Sea is diverse. Countries have different authorities 
responsible for different tasks, as shown below. Other types of organisational differences exist 
additionally, for example centralised command in Germany, Estonia, Denmark and Lithuania 
compared to the decentralised responsibility in Sweden.
Denmark
Division of responsibility
From the 1st of January 2000, the response responsibility to oil spills or other hazardous and 
noxious substances at sea and in coastal waters was moved from the Danish Ministry of the 
Environment and Energy to the Danish Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence has 
subsequently  delegated the authority  to Defence Command Denmark, who delegated the 
contingency  function to the Admiral Danish Fleet, also called the Royal Danish Navy. The 
Headquarters of the Royal Danish Navy, Søværnets Operative Kommando (SOK), is responsible for 
preventing or minimising oil pollution damage to the marine environment, natural resources and 
recreational areas on coastlines and beaches. 
MAS (Maritime Assistance Service) is an integral part of the Danish Navy. It acts as a central 
maritime contact point for shipping inside and around Danish territorial waters. The main task of 
the MAS is to handle communication with the ship  masters that are in need of assistance, but also 
other maritime stakeholders, for example salvage companies, fleet owners and port authorities. 
MAS is manned around the clock to deploy rapid assistance and professional support for ships in 
need. This can be combating pollution, fire and explosions on board, collisions, groundings and 
maritime security. MAS receives Ship Security  Alert System distress calls from Danish and foreign 
vessels in Danish waters. 
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Response and clean-up of beaches and ports are the responsibility of the coastal municipality  in 
question, but most often assisted by the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA).
Oil producing companies and offshore oil drilling operations must have their own contingency 
plans and organisation as well as equipment. The plans must be approved by the Danish 
Environmental Protection Agency and must include alarm and communication chains in the 
organisation and to the authorities, chain of command, equipment, capacity and location list, 
response techniques, monitoring systems, access routes, crew training, temporary storage, 
transportation and destruction of contaminated material and regular exercises.
Operations
In case of an oil spill, SOK will decide if a response will be initiated or not, to what extent and with 
which method. If there is a need to use dispersants, the Ministry  of Environment must give special 
permission. If there is a larger spill, the Danish fleet will assign an On-Scene Commander (OSC) to 
lead the response. Furthermore, a group  will be established, with representatives from different 
stakeholders, organisations and authorities. When the oil hits the shore, the affected community  can 
seek help from DEMA. Oily waste is transported to already established contractors, for example 
Kommunen Kemi and Gunnar Lund Olieservice. For illegal discharges into the sea, the Admiral 
Danish Fleet  is responsible for the enforcement of the Danish Marine Environment Protection Act 
in the Danish Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Operations at sea when it comes to oil spill response is conducted with vessels from the Admiral 
Danish Fleet, the Danish Maritime Safety Administration (DaMSA) and private salvage companies, 
among others. If private companies are used, these have an already established contract. During 
these operations, air support is accessible through the Danish Air Force.
Equipment
The Admiral Danish Fleet uses seven vessels equipped with different quality  of booms, skimmers, 
pumps and other material located at the different bases of the Navy. Details of these can be found in 
Appendix 2.
Additionally, tugs and salvage vessels can be hired from private contractors.
DEMA has five stockpiles of equipment in Denmark, located in Thisted, Herning, Haderslev, 
Næstved and Allinge. These contain material for both shoreline response and clean-up.
Exercises
There is a national oil spill contingency plan in place and since a few years, oil spill contingency 
plans for the municipalities. The national contingency plan is exercised five or six times a year, with 
two or three municipalities taking part each time.
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Estonia
Division of responsibility
The role of the Ministry of the Environment is to act as the strategical coordinator in environmental 
matters at international level. The responsibility for pollution both at sea and in the lakes Lämmi 
and Pihkva are the responsibility  of the Ministry of the Interior, who has delegated the 
responsibility to the Estonian Rescue Board (ERB). The ERB is responsible for the tactical 
coordination of the different national organisations and stakeholders and also coordinates the 
international help.
The ERB is further subdivided into three different branches:
- Estonian Coastal Rescue Centre, with four regional centres
- Emergency centres, in four different locations
- Explosive Ordinance Disposal, with four different groups
The Joint Rescue and Coordination Centre Tallinn (JRCC Tallinn) are available around the clock 
and handle calls on maritime accidents, although primarily search and rescue.
The beach clean up is the responsibility of the Estonian Rescue Board, but is delegated to the 
regional rescue centres and the local municipalities.
The larger ports are responsible for their own oil spill response.
Operations
When an oil spill occurs at  sea, the alarm will come to the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) or the Gulf 
of Finland reporting area (GOFREP) first. These will forward the alarm to the JRCC Tallinn and 
these in turn will inform the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB), who are responsible for the 
oil spill response at sea. When the oil hits the shore, this responsibility is the Estonian Rescue Board 
(ERB), who has 83 rescue service stations spread around the country. There are laws regulating the 
transportation of oily waste and in Estonia, there are several locations where oil and contaminated 
material can be incinerated or buried. The command centre for the response operation can, 
depending on the size of the operation, be located at the respective regions’ PBGB office.
Mechanical removal of oil is the primary method used and dispersants are severely limited 
according to the HELCOM  recommendations. It is only allowed in the most extreme cases and then 
in agreement with the Ministry of the Environment.
Equipment
The ERB uses the three tier system when it comes to response to oil spills. The response resources 
are different between these tiers.
Tier 1 response, at  the local level, is placed at five different locations: Kuressaare, Kärdla, 
Haapsalu, Mustamäe och Kohtla-Järve and has capacity to respond to spills of 1 000 litres of light 
oils at sea or on land and equip 30 volunteers with personal protection equipment.
Tier 2 response, at the regional level, is placed at  four different locations: Haapsalu, Tartu, 
Mustamäe och Kohtla-Järve. They have the capacity to each respond to a spill of 10 000 litres of 
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light oils at  sea and on land, equip 50 volunteers with personal protection equipment for three days 
and nights. They additionally have 105 coastal boom, 500mm * 200 m and 750 * 200 m beach 
boom, access to hot water washers, skimmers and transport vehicles.
Tier 3 response, at the national level, is located at one location in Kose. It has capacity to eliminate 
and skim both light oils and viscous oils at up to 10 m3 per hour and equip 50 volunteers with 
personal protection equipment for seven days and nights. Additionally, they have equipment for bird 
washing volunteers, 1 300 m coastal boom and 350 m beach boom, vacuum pumps, absorbents and 
access to trucks, tanks and other all terrain vehicles for transport.
JRCC Tallinn has three response vessels. Details of these can be found in Appendix 2.
The larger ports have their own oil spill response equipment, since they  are responsible for their 
own clean up.
Exercises
As members of HELCOM, Estonia takes part in the Balex Delta exercises held every year.
Finland
Division of responsibility
In Finland, the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE) is the marine pollution response authority 
under the Ministry  of the Environment. The Ministry of Environment has supreme management and 
supervisory responsibility against oil pollution and also against other harmful substances. SYKE is 
responsible for the response measures necessitated by incidents on the open sea, which includes 
purchase and development of governmental oil combatting equipment. It is also responsible to give 
and request international assistance to marine pollution caused by oil or other toxic substances. 
SYKE also has the authority to order the undertaking of salvage operation, if a vessel is in a 
position that has a risk for pollution.
The Centres for Economic Development, Transport  and the Environment (ELY) give advice and 
supervise the local municipalities and commercial companies on pollution response and 
preparedness. When necessary, they also participate in the response operations.
The Rescue Service, who are financed by the municipalities have according to Finnish law 
responsibility to uphold a response readiness and have a contingency plan in place for the respective 
coastal municipalities. These oil spill contingency plans need an approval of ELY, before they are 
implemented. ELY also give advice and supervise the local municipalities and commercial 
companies on pollution response and preparedness. When necessary, they also participate in the 
response operations.
There are three coastal region oil spill response plans and one national. If needed, the defence 
forces, border guard and the Finnish traffic Safety Agency  (Trafi) participate in the response, as 
well as private companies.
Ports, terminals and other facilities that handle oil are required to be able to respond to realistic oil 
spills in their respective facilities.
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Other authorities are obliged to assist in oil or chemical spill combatting within their abilities. The 
goal is for Finland to be able to handle spills of up to 30 000 tonnes of oil.
Finland adheres to the ”Polluter Pays Principle” and has in addition to this policy a national Oil 
Pollution Fund that will cover the costs for oil pollution response, when no polluter can be 
identified. The fund is financed by  a set tonnage fee that the transport companies pay to leave or 
transport oil through Finnish waters. The administration is handled by  the Ministry  of the 
Environment, but the compensation decision rests with an independent committee. From this fund, 
the Rescue Service is then permitted to seek compensation for purchasing new equipment that is 
recommended by a ELY approved contingency plan. This means that SYKE does not automatically 
have access to the fund. The government has the right to apply for compensation for equipment as 
well, and this is judged on a case by case basis.
Operations
The alarm most often reach the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC/MRSC) through 
radio, pilot or the Coast Guard. MRCC then contact SYKE’s officer on call. SYKE, in turn contact 
the relevant authorities, initiate and coordinate the response and make sure that oil spill response 
vessels, equipment and other necessary  personal are at hand. The Finnish Meteorological Institute is 
also contacted, to give an oil spill drift forecast.
In case of a smaller local spill, a local commander is appointed to lead the response. If the situation 
is larger than the first estimate, neighbouring regions, national authorities or SYKE can be called in 
for assistance.
Equipment
SYKE maintains 13 stations well equipped with booms, skimmers, pumps and other oil spill 
response material. These stations are located in Oulu, Vaasa, Rahja, Pori, Uusikaupunki, Turku, 
Nauvo, Hanko, Kirkkonummi, Porvoo, Kotka and two in the area of Lake Saimaa. The Finnish 
government has 16 oil spill response vessels equipped with a fixed brush system and extendable 
arms. Details of these can be found in Appendix 2. There is around 100 km of boom available. Out 
of these, 10 km is rugged boom, which work well in oil response in rough weather out on the sea.
All the coastal communities maintain a total of 140 smaller oil spill response vessels between 10 
and 20 m. Of these, 32 are equipped with oil recovery systems and the rest  are used to ferry 
personnel, equipment and to deploy boom. The Rescue Service within each municipality have 
access to equipment to respond to oil spills in shallower and near shore waters.
Oil terminals have their own stores of equipment to be able to respond to a spill of reasonable size 
in their own operations.
Finland do not have any oil spill response companies and do not use dispersants.
Exercises
Finland holds several exercises annually, both national and international. In 2011, Finland 
participated in four international exercises, one in each of Estonia, Russia, Sweden and Denmark. 
For the exercise in Estonia, four vessels were sent, one Navy, one Border Guard and two from 
Meritaito LTD. To the exercise in Sweden, three vessels were sent  and to the Danish exercise two. 
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Since there are so many international exercises in 2011, no national exercises will be held, which is 
otherwise the case.
The latest national exercise was arranged by Kymenlaaksos Rescue Service, close to Kotka, where 
five kilometres of boom was deployed. During these exercises, personnel from SYKE are involved 
both as advisors and evaluators.
In 2010, Finland conducted an exercise with EMSA, when their new response vessel Kontio, to be 
stationed in the northern Baltic Sea, was inducted.
The national exercises conducted involve one or more vessels with personnel from different 
organisations. These can involve internal drills to update the vessel crew on the response 
equipment.
The Rescue Service has their own exercises, but involves SYKE by  evaluating how fast they can 
deploy at a given location with vessels, equipment and personnel.
In 2012, Finland is host to the Balex Delta exercise, which is planned a year in advance. In this 
exercise, all the oil spill response organisations in Finland will participate as well as several 
international vessels.
Germany
Division of responsibility
The responsibility of oil spill contingency planning is shared by the federal government through the 
Federal Waterways and Shipping (WSV) within the ministry of transport and the federal coastal 
states Bremen, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein. To 
coordinate this preparedness the Central Command for Maritime Emergencies (CCME) was created 
2003 and based in Cauxhaven. CCME is responsible to update the national oil spill response 
preparedness.
Even though no requirement exist, some coastal municipalities have their own oil spill response 
plans.
Individual ports are responsible for their own response and contingency plans, as well as 
equipment.
Operations
In case of an oil spill at sea, the CCME will take the main responsibility after having communicated 
with the Maritime Emergencies Reporting and Assessment Centre (MERC) will take the lead in the 
response operation and call teams on site and to the coordination centre. CCME contain five 
sections, of whom 3 will be activated. Sector 1 is the MERC, who is the national maritime 
coordination point on call around the clock. Sector 2 will be responsible for the response on the sea 
and sector 3 for the shoreline around the coastal states and additionally for the Wadden Sea. If 
needed, the CCME will handle the entire coordination, including all the involved organisations, for 
example the rescue services, disaster help corps, the marine and salvage companies. The cost will 
be split equally between the federal government and the coastal state.
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Equipment
The national oil spill contingency  plan include a computerised map system that  detail sensitive 
areas and habitats in need of special protection along the coast, called the Marine Atlas. The federal 
maritime and hydrological agency have a weather and ocean current  forecasting program developed 
for the North Sea, the German bays, Wadden Sea and the Baltic Sea.
The coastal states of Germany have developed a software and a system for data collection and 
storage of all the different kinds of data of the coastal states, including pollution caused by 
accidents. The software connects the database, GIS text  and photos in a multimedia user interface. 
The VPS system supports the contingency planning and the response by supplying information on 
among other things; contact details, organisational details, contingency routines, detailed photos of 
the entire German coastline, location of oil spill equipment, vessel details and flight routes, oil 
response manual, sensitive areas, accident reports, logbooks, development and tracking and oil spill 
drift modelling using the SeaTrack Web program.
A wide selection, around 16, of the more or less universal oil spill response vessels are owned to a 
large extent by the government. The vessels of private oil spill companies are primarily deployed 
around the larger ports.
Germany regard themselves to be well prepared to handle a spill of 15 000 m3 oil if mechanical 
recovery is possible. Mechanical recovery is prioritised at sea and the use of dispersants is only 
allowed at depths exceeding 20 meters under exceptional circumstances.
The Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (Bundesamt Für Seeschiffahrt und Hydrographie, 
BSH) has a dedicated laboratory for analysing oil for the police and rescue services. It is based in 
Hamburg but can on request immediately redeploy to the incident site.
Pollution response equipment for coast, river and shoreline is located at several different points in 
Germany. The federal stations are Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, Kiel, Warnemünde, Stralsund and the 
state owned Hilgenriedersiel, Husum, Meldorf, Rostock, Cuxhaven, Stralsund, Heiligendamm, Kiel, 
Wilhelmshaven, Stralsund, Bremerhaven, Bremen, Lübeck, Flensburg, Hamburg, Brunsbüttel, 
Kägsdorf, Eutin, Wittmund and Jever.
The busiest sea traffic routes are constantly patrolled by  around 30 Coast Guard vessels, partly to 
deter, but also to look for oil spills. These vessels are operated from two Coast Guard centrals in the 
North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Details of these can be found in Appendix 2.
The overflights log around 1 600 hours a year and primarily patrol the German coastline and the 
busiest sea traffic routes.
Exercises
The oil spill exercises do not follow any specific schedule, but is influenced by several factors. In 
practice, there are around 20 exercises per year. Participants in these exercises are the CCME and 
affected municipalities. Germany does not have any dedicated Coast Guard yet, which means that 
they are excluded from international exercises exclusive for the Coast Guards.
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Latvia
Division of responsibility
The Latvian Coast Guard, who are under the department of defence, are responsible for the 
response in case of a national oil spill disaster. The Coast Guard have response stations in the three 
largest ports, Riga, Liepaja and Ventspils. MRCC Riga, under the Latvian Coast Guard, is available 
around the clock. There is a special committee that takes charge in case of a larger oil spill 
catastrophe. The rescue service and municipalities are delegated by the ministry of the interior to 
have responsibility of the shoreline clean up.
The municipalities have no specific oil spill contingency plans, the oil spill response responsibility 
rests with the local rescue service.
Each port authority  has their own oil spill contingency  plan, which is linked to the national 
contingency plan.
The older oil spill contingency plan from 2004 was recently  replaced with a new one, that includes 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) and entered into force in May 2010.
Operations
In case of a larger oil spill, the MRCC committee in Riga will take full responsibility of the 
response operation and work as a coordination centre, Both on sea and on land response will be 
handled together by the Coast Guard and the rescue service. The clean up of the beaches is still the 
responsibility of the coastal municipality.
In case of a smaller spill, the response is still handled by  MRCC Riga, initially by  the officer on call 
and subsequently transferred to an oil spill coordinator.
The ports are responsible for response of oil spills in their respective areas.
Mechanical recovery of oil is the primary method of response, and the use of dispersants is 
extremely limited and only possible in agreement with the ministry  of environmental protection and 
regional development.
Equipment
Latvia has access to three oil spill response vessels. Details of these can be found in Appendix 2.
Additionally, six smaller Navy vessels will be available to help during an oil spill response.
There is a general agreement made between the larger port authorities that they should make private 
vessels available in case of an oil spill response operation in their port areas.
When building the oil spill contingency plan, a computerised environmental atlas was developed. 
This will be used with a weather and ocean current modelling program to forecast where the oil will 
spread.
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Exercises
The national oil spill contingency plan is exercised once a year and involve all the three response 
levels, administration, coordinators and decision makers. The main actors are the impacted 
municipalities, national rescue service, port authorities, the maritime administration of Latvia and 
the Ocean and Lake administration.
The Latvian Coast Guard normally  exercise twice per year. One is a theoretical exercise for the 
coordinators and one a practical exercise for the field staff.
Lithuania
Division of responsibility
The responsible authority for guidelines and standards on oil spill contingency plans along the 
Lithuanian coast is the regional department for environmental protection in Klaipėda. The 
municipalities themselves are responsible for the existence of an oil spill contingency plan for 
shoreline clean up. The Lithuanian Navy are responsible for the coordination and actual response. 
According to the contingency plans, the civil defence can be called in if needed. In the clean up 
phase of the response, the ministry of the interior will be involved as well, since they are 
responsible for the rescue service.
A national oil spill contingency  plan was written by the Lithuanian Maritime Institute in 1994 and 
was signed in 2009 by the departments of defence, environmental protection and internal affairs.
Operations
According to the Lithuanian governments proposition no. 1378, the different authorities in an oil 
spill response are based on different marine areas. The Lithuanian Navy are responsible for the 
Baltic proper, through the MRCC Klaipėda and are also generally  responsible for the entire 
operation. They also work as the coordinators for national oil spill response and clean up. The clean 
up is the responsibility of the duty officer, who delegate this to an on scene coordinator. MRCC 
Klaipėda is available around the clock. The Lithuanian Coast Guard are responsible for the 
Curonian lagoon and the port authorities for their own respective ports. The clean up is then the 
responsibility of the individual municipalities. The civil defence can offer manpower to help with 
shoreline clean up along the whole of the Lithuanian coast.
The use of dispersants is forbidden and should be extremely  limited, according to the HELCOM 
recommendations. If such a situation arises, an approval must  first come from the ministry  of the 
environment.
Equipment
Most of the oil spill response material and equipment in Lithuania are available at the MRCC in 
Klaipėda, partly onboard their vessels and partly in warehouses on land. The surveillance using 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is also managed here.
In cooperation with the Lithuanian air force, there is aerial surveillance using EMSA’s 2nd 
generation CleanSeaNet 2-4 times a month.
A computer based system detailing sensitive areas and more sensitive areas along the coast exists. 
The oil spill drift model used is HELCOM’s SeaTrack Web program.
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In case of a larger spill, the Coast Guard has a vessel equipped with skimmer. The Marine can 
contribute with additional vessels. The port authority  in Būtingė can use their retrofitted tug. Details 
of these can be found in Appendix 2.
Every  municipality have responsibility  for their own coastline and have generally  only less 
specialised equipment, like shovels and road scrapers.
The oil terminal in Būtingė has its own booms, skimmers, brushes, tanks and pumps in addition to 
well trained personnel. This equipment is spread through all the ports.
 
Exercises
In order to constantly develop and improve the oil spill response, Lithuania is annually participating 
in international, national and regional exercises. Participating actors are the Coast  Guard, air force 
helicopters, Navy vessels and private companies, particularly the Polish oil company PKN Orlen 
and the Būtingė oil terminal, where PKN Orlen is a majority owner.
Poland
Division of responsibility
In Poland, it is the Ministry of the Environment that is the main governmental authority  responsible 
for management of the environment. The Ministry of Infrastructure is responsible for the 
environmental issues relating to maritime transport.
The responsible ministry is responsible for the maritime administration and the maritime economy. 
It answers to the Ministry of Infrastructure and has mandate from the Marine Areas Administration 
act. The responsibility  for the response itself is delegated to the Maritime Search And Rescue 
Service (SAR Service), who are responsible for the SAR convention and is located in Gdynia.
Under the SAR Service, there is an operational department with four specialised divisions, the 
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC), Maritime Search and Rescue Division, Maritime 
Pollution Combating Division and the Information Centre of the Sea Administration. MRCC is the 
national contact in case of an oil spill at sea.
When it comes to pollution in the port  areas, this is the responsibility of the harbour master. Oil 
terminals and wharfs are responsible for pollution related to their own operations and is reviewed 
by the harbour master or environmental inspectors from the relevant maritime administration.
The local oil spill contingency plans are coordinated with SAR Service together with the local 
rescue services and is then approved by the director of the relevant maritime office. The local plans 
are integrated in the national contingency plan. The plan includes, contact points, different ways to 
report and alarm in case of pollution incidents, list and location of measures and equipment to 
combat environmental and pollution threats, an action plan, a pollution risk assessment, tasks for 
the different  response organisations, financial issues, guidelines for international assistance, training 
plan, oil spill effect monitoring programme and a list of experts.
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The responsibility of the contingency planning and the operative response is the overall 
responsibility of the response and clean up on sea and land is the ministry of the interior, who work 
through three coastal regional crisis management centres. 
Operations
MRCC Gdynia is the national contact point  for safety  of life at sea and marine pollution. If an alarm 
is received anywhere else, for example the coastal radio stations or one of the three communications 
centres around the coast, the MRCC Gdynia is alerted as well.
In case of an oil spill, the officer in charge of the maritime office has the responsibility to judge the 
situation and act accordingly.
The areas of responsibility  of SAR Service when it comes to oil spill response are the open sea, 
coastal shallow waters and ports. In all of these cases, the response works through the contingency 
plan, either at local level or the relevant national level.
When the oil hits land, the officer in charge alerts the regional (Voivodship) governor as well as the 
regional environmental inspectors, who then work through the county  and down to the municipal 
level. If the oil spill should impact more than one region, the national crisis management centre 
would be utilised.
The only company that do oil prospecting in Poland is Petrobaltic Co. Ltd. This company has 1 000 
m booms, several smaller skimmers and experience to assist in case of a larger oil spill. They  also 
have five vessels in Gdansk; Afrodite, Bazalt, Granit, Santa Barbara and Vivero.
Poland primarily  uses mechanical methods for recovering oil at sea and follow the HELCOM 
recommendations for dispersants. This means that the use of dispersants is restricted and must have 
an approval from the maritime authorities.
A new version of the national oil spill contingency plan was approved in February 2006 and 
contains among other things a marine atlas of sensitive areas and temporary storage locations for 
oily waste. Additionally, the refinery in Gdansk is prepared to receive recovered oil.
Equipment
SAR Service have three custom built vessels for oil spill response at sea. Details of these can be 
found in Appendix 2.
The different  maritime rescue stations are located in Darłowo, Dziwnów, Kołobrzeg, Łeba, 
Sztutowo, Świbno, Trzebież, Ustka and Władysławowo. Additionally, there are two warehouses 
with oil spill response equipment in Gdynia and Świnoujście.
The larger ports have their own oil spill response material for Tier 1 (local) and some even have 
material for a Tier 2 (regional) oil spill. If the spill is larger still, SAR Service will assist with 
material.
Exercises
SAR Service recommend that the contingency plans are exercised once a year, but the requirements 
are for every  other or every third year only. There is no requirement to have a larger exercise 
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regularly. A larger exercise was held during summer of 2011 involving SAR Service, the navy, port 
authorities in Gdynia, the commercial port, the maritime administration, the rescue service and the 
crisis management centre of Gdynia.
Internationally, the Polish Navy frequent the Balex Delta exercises of HELCOM  and Polish SAR 
Service has operational agreements with the German Pollution Response Service and the port of 
Kaliningrad.
Russian Federation
Division of responsibility
The State Marine Pollution Control, Rescue and Salvage Administration (MPCRSA) is the national 
authority that is responsible for oil spills at sea. It is organised under the Sea and River Transport 
Agency of the Ministry of Transport. The Federal Sea and River Transport Agency  is the authority 
that, when needed, will conduct a revision of the national oil spill response plan. This was last done 
in 2003 and approved by the ministry of commerce, the ministry  of natural resources, the ministry 
of defence and the Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of 
Natural Disaster (EMERCOM). This oil spill contingency plan is planned for a spill of 5 000 
tonnes.
The federal Sea and River Transport Agency has the responsibility to uphold search and rescue 
response. This is done through the MPCRSA and Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC). 
MRCC have both regional stations and assisting centres.
The Russian Federation has developed oil spill contingency plans for all of their regions, the Baltic 
Sea, the Black Sea, NW Pacific, the Caspian Sea and the Arctic. The oil spill response can be 
activated at the local, regional and federal level. 
All companies that handle oil during transportation or loading must have an oil spill contingency 
plan and material. This material can be requisitioned to a disaster site, if needed. Either to help the 
rescue service at a beach cleanup, or MPRCRSA at sea.
Operations
In case of an oil spill in the Russian waters of the Baltic Sea, the MRCC in St. Petersburg will 
initiate a search and rescue response and coordinate the initial response. They will then only work 
as a communication centre, since the responsibility for the response operation rests on MPCRSA. 
The land based response is the responsibility  of EMERCOM. In case of a Tier 3 response, 
EMERCOM is also responsible for the coordination of the Navy, Boarder Guard and local 
municipalities. The regional part of the MPCRSA can supply  resources for the response and 
resources from EMERCOM can also be deployed, if there is a need.
MPCRSA has the full responsibility for the Basin Salvage and Towage Company (BASU). This is a 
government owned company that is part of the MPCRSA’s regional branch and is to be available for 
salvage and towing operations. If an oil spill should be greater than the local capacity of the Tier 1 
response (0-500 tonnes) and the regional Tier 2 response, (500-5 000 tonnes), it is the responsibility 
of the MPCRSA to mobilise the national Tier 3 response supplies.
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The general strategy for oil spill response is that Tier 1 spills will be dealt with using mechanical 
recovery, if the weather allows. Tier 2 and 3 response is depending on the circumstances for that 
particular spill. It is not forbidden to use dispersants and in-situ burning. However, it has to be 
approved by the government and included in the oil spill contingency plan before it is used.
If there is an oil spill in a company, their oil spill contingency plan will be activated. If the 
company’s own resources are insufficient  for the spill, they  are bund to inform the local and 
regional authorities. In that case, the regional contingency plan will be activated. If this also proves 
insufficient, the federal oil spill contingency plan and resources will be mobilised.
Equipment
Details of the Russian response vessels can be found in Appendix 2.
All ports, terminals and other companies storing oil must have oil spill contingency plans and 
equipment in case of an oil spill. A fundamental part of this plan is to assess the resources required 
to respond to a worst case scenario. This means that these companies should have their own 
response teams or have a contract with companies that has the resources for this task.
The equipment of these companies usually contain vessels, booms, skimmers and other equipment. 
The ports of Murmansk, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok and Sakhalin all have oil spill response vessels, 
supply vessels, booms, trawls, pumps etc. There is even a few private and local oil spill response 
companies stationed here.
The first of these companies approved for oil spill response at sea and on land is Ecoshelf Ltd and 
was founded in 1997. Ecoshelf cooperates with Sakhalin Energy  and is responsible for Sakhalin’s 
oil spill response. Ecoshelf has several vessels and oil spill response material. There is an Ecoshelf 
station in Vyborg called Ecoshelf Baltic servicing the oil terminal of Lukoil in Vysotsk, a Ecoshelf 
Black Sea in Novorossijsk and an Ecoshelf Caspian Sea in Astrakhan.
Exercises
Both local municipalities and companies that handle oil conduct their own exercises. In the summer 
of 2010, a federal oil spill exercise was held outside the port  of Vysotsk. The exercise started at the 
oil spill terminal and subsequently  expanded through the regional, national and international levels. 
In October 2011, the Environmental Protection committee conducted an exercise, where they 
invited different authorities and companies. Sadly, there was a lack of representation from the 
regional and federal rescue services.
Sweden
Division of responsibility
The Swedish Coast Guard is responsible for marine pollution at sea since 1971. This mandate 
extends to the great lakes of Sweden, Vänern, Vättern and Mälaren and the responsibility extends 
all the way  to the shoreline, although in reality, the Coast Guard vessels can generally not come 
close to shore. There are 25 Coast Guard stations around the Swedish coast.
No authority  has overall responsibility  for oil spill contingency plans on land and no requirements 
exists to have such a plan. Some municipalities and counties have developed such a plan anyway, or 
are in the process of developing one. According to a Swedish survey, 31 % of the Swedish 
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municipalities had an oil spill contingency plan that had been used in an exercise in the last 5 years 
in 2011. (Baltic Master II, 2011b)
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) oversee strategic rescue service operations and 
encourage development of plans. They are responsible for upholding the response preparedness on 
land, in five regional centres around Sweden and the Swedish lakes.
The Swedish Agency  for Marine and Water Management (SwAM) has a standing contract with an 
environmental consultancy firm to uphold a specialist  team of oil spill experts. This team can be 
called in to assist the municipalities in case of an oil spill, free of charge for the municipality in 
question.
Ports and private companies are responsible for their own operational needs.
Operations
The alarm is first received at the Coast Guard coordination centre and the regional officer will act as 
the commanding officer in charge of the response. There are checklists available for the continued 
alarm chain to the relevant authorities in the effected municipalities and counties. If the oil spill is 
large, international help can be requested.
The Coast Guard only  use mechanical removal of oil and has no permission to use dispersants. 
Some existing systems could, potentially, be used for dispersant application.
The shoreline response is the responsibility of the local Rescue Service. The Swedish law dictates 
that the response phase is finished when the risk for injuries and property damage can no longer be 
increased. This then turns into the clean-up phase, which is the local municipality’s responsibility. 
In case of a larger oil spill, the Rescue Service can request assistance from MSB’s regional centres.
Equipment
The Swedish Coast Guard has several vessels designed for oil spill response. Details of these can be 
found in Appendix 2. They have additional supplies such as pumps, skimmers, boom and containers 
in store.
MSB has five mobile oil spill centres in different regions of the country. The idea is to complement 
the resources of the municipalities, if they are insufficient. The supply  units are located in Botkyrka, 
Vänersborg, Karlskrona, Umeå and Visby.
The centres are loaded in containers and ready to be deployed where necessary. They contain, boats, 
boat trailers, pumps, skimmers, boom, shore protection cloth, temporary storage units, all terrain 
vehicles, shovels, buckets and personal protection gear for 200 persons and various additional 
material, such as digital cameras, radios and high pressure steamers.
Oil terminals, ports and other companies that handle oil are required to have a basic preparedness to 
be able to handle their own accidents and pollution.
The County  Administrative Boards of Sweden have an Environmental Atlas, showing priority  sites 
and different coastal zones. The atlas, however, has several data gaps and does not encompass the 
entire Swedish coastline and several counties are in the process of updating the material.
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Sweden also uses the SeaTrack Web oil spill drift forecast model.
Exercises
Sweden holds annual exercises under the Copenhagen agreement, Bonn agreement and HELCOM. 
Only in the last five years have they started including shoreline response.
On the stations around Sweden where oil spill response vessels are located, there are continuos 
exercises. Additional exercises are conducted with the Swedish Sea Rescue Society (SSRS), since 
they  have several stations with ”First Aid” booms, which are 200 m boom an a sea sled. The Coast 
Guard annually  participate in HELCOM’s Balex Delta exercises. Within the Copenhagen 
agreement, annual exercises with Finland on the Swedish east coast, Denmark on the south coast 
and both Denmark and Norway on the west coast are also conducted. The municipalities that have 
an oil spill plan only rarely conduct exercises.
Aerial surveillance
Under the auspices of HELCOM, coordinated aerial surveillance is conducted regularly in the 
Baltic Sea area. Between 1999 and 2009, the the number of observed spills has declined by  63 % 
(see figure 5). This trend has been observed during a time of increase in the shipping traffic and is 
attributed by  HELCOM to the complex set of measures known as the Baltic Strategy to prevent 
illegal discharges of oil and waste into the sea. The HELCOM  countries have been implementing 
this strategy since the 1990s. Additional data is gathered from satellite images by the CleanSeaNet 
(CSN) satellite service of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). The suspected oil spills 
identified on the satellite images are then verified on location by  a vessel or aircraft. In 2009, 608 
satellite images were delivered to the Baltic Sea countries. The images showed 280 suspected oil 
spills and 0,46 oil spills per suspected spill were detected. (HELCOM, 2011c)
hour index, which compares the total number of 
observed oil spills to the total number of fl ight 
hours. The index for the Baltic Sea has been 
decreasing over the past years, which indicates less 
oil spills and increased surveillance activity.
Some 168 of the oil discharges (98%) detected 
in 2009 were smaller than one cubic metre; of 
these, 138 were even smaller than 0.1 cubic metre 
or 100 litres. Only one spill was over 10 cubic 
metres and the total estimated volume of oil 
spills observed in 2009 amounted to 40.3 cubic 
metres. In 2007, there were four discharges of 
over 10 cubic metres, and the total estimated 
volume of oil spills amounted to 125.4 cubic 
metres.
ago in 1999, a total of 488 discharges were 
detected during 4,883 air patrol hours.
The number and size of detected oil spillages in 
the Baltic Sea has been decreasing over the past 
years, even though the density of shipping has 
rapidly grown and the aerial surveillance activity 
in the countries has been substantially improved. 
This positive trend is attributed to the complex 
set of measures known as the Baltic Strategy to 
prevent illegal discharges of oil and waste into 
the sea, which the HELCOM countries have been 
implementing since the 1990s.
The best way to evaluate the number of illegal 
oil discharges is to refl ect it as pollution per fl ight 
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Figure 13. Total number of fl ight hours and observed oil spills in the HELCOM 
area during aerial surveillance, 1988–2009
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Figure 5: Number of spills in correlation with flight hours in the HELCOM area 1988-2009. (HELCOM, 2011c)
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International conventions
There are several international conventions governing marine pollution in the Baltic Sea region 
made by  the IMO. Table 1 gives an overview of the relevant conventions and their status. Most 
notably, the Bunkers Convention has been ratified by all the states in this region except Sweden. 
Table 1: Status of IMO conventions relating to ship-source marine pollution in the states of the Baltic region. 
In the table, x means accession, ratification, etc. and d means denunciation (Baltic Master II, 2011c).
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Annex 1 
 
Status of IMO conventions relating to ship-source marine pollution in the states 
of the Baltic region 
 
In the following table x means accession, ratification, etc. and d means denunciation 
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Denmark x x x x x x x x x d x x d x x x x x  x x x     
Estonia x x x x x   x x d  x x  x x x x  x x x     
Finland x x x x x x  x x d x x d x x x x x   x      
Germany x x x x x x x x x d x x d x x x x x  x x x     
Latvia x x x x x   x x x  x   x x x x   x x     
Lithuania x x x x x       x   x x x x x  x x     
Poland x x x x x x  x x d x x d x x x x x  x x x     
Russian 
Federation x x x x  x  x x d x x d x x  x x x  x     
 
Sweden x x x x x x x x x d x x d x x x x x  x  x x    
 
 
 Previous oil spills
There has never been a major oil spill in the Baltic Sea. As stated before, the largest oil spill in the 
Baltic Sea was the Globe Asimi outside Klaipėda in Lithuania 1981, who spilled 16 000 tonnes. 
Comparing this to other spills that  have occurred in the rest of the world, the amount of oil spilt  is 
not very significant (see table 2). The different Baltic Sea countries have been affected by  oil spills 
at different frequencies as well. Poland has been fortunate to never have had an oil spill, while 
Estonia and Finland have reported a great number of smaller spills over the years. This is both a 
blessing and a curse, since the Baltic Sea has been spared a potentially  disastrous event, but it has 
also caused the preventive and response work in the area to have a low priority. As always seem to 
be the case, preventive measures are difficult  to implement until a significant accident actually 
happens.
Table 2: Large oil spill accidents in the world and in the Baltic Sea (adapted from ITOPF, 2011).
Name Year Location Spill size (tonnes)
Atlantic Empress 1979 Off Tobago, West Indies 287 000
ABT Summer 1991 700 nm off Angola 260 000
Castillo de Bellver 1983 Off Saldanha Bay, South 
Africa
252 000
Amoco Cadiz 1978 Off Brittany, France 223 000
Haven 1991 Genoa, Italy 144 000
Odyssey 1988 700 nm off Nova Scotia, 
Canada
132 000
Torrey Canyon 1967 Scilly Isles, UK 119 000
Irenes Serenade 1980 Navarino Bay, Greece 100 000
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Name Year Location Spill size (tonnes)
Urquiola 1976 La Coruna, Spain 100 000
Hawaiian Patriot 1977 300 nm off Honolulu 95 000
Independenta 1979 Bosphorus, Turkey 95 000
Jakob Maersk 1975 Oporto, Portugal 88 000
Braer 1993 Shetland Islands, UK 85 000
Khark 5 1989 120 nm off Marocco 80 000
Aegean Sea 1992 La Coruna, Spain 74 000
Sea Empress 1996 Milford Haven, UK 72 000
Nova 1985 Off Kharg Island, Gulf of Iran 70 000
Katina P 1992 Off Maputo, Mozambique 66 700
Prestige 2002 Off Galicia, Spain 63 000
Exxon Valdez 1989 Prince William Sound, Alaska 37 000
Globe Asimi 1981 Klaipėda, Lithuania 16 000
Antonio Gramsci 1979 Åland, Finland 5 500
Weston 1998 Västra Götaland county, 
Sweden
4 000
North Pacific 2001 Klaipėda, Lithuania 3 427
Baltic Carrier 2001 Kadetrenden, Denmark 2 700
Volgoneft 139 2007 Kerch strait, Black Sea 2 000
Fu Shan Hai 2003 Ystad, Sweden 1 200
Tsesis 1977 Stockholm, Sweden 1 000
Volgoneft 1990 Karlskrona, Sweden 1 000
Antonio Gramsci 1987 Vaarlshti, Finland 650
Esso Nordica 1970 Pellinki, Finland 600
Golden Trader 2011 NW of Denmark 500
Pensa 1970 Hailuoto, Finland 500
Tolmiros (suspect) 1987 Västra Götaland county, 
Sweden
400
Sotka 1985 Märket, Finland 370
Eira 1984 Merenkurkku, Finland 300
Unknown 1988 Torekov, Sweden 287
Alambra 2000 Muuga harbour, Estonia 250
Raphael 1969 Emäsalo, Finland 250
Pallas 1998 Wadden Sea, Germany 244
Thuntank 5 1987 Bay of Gävle, Sweden 230
Herakles 2004 Grundkallen, Sweden 200
Palva 1969 Utö, Finland 200
Unknown 1992 Västra Götaland and Halland 
counties, Sweden
200
Hual Trooper 1995 Öresund, Sweden 180
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Name Year Location Spill size (tonnes)
Godafoss 2009 Hvaler, Norway 112
Kihnu 1993 Kopli peninsula, Estonia 100
Lloyd Bage 1979 Harmaja, Finland 100
Nunki 1998 Kalundborg Fjord, Denmark 100
Runner 4 2006 Gulf of Finland 100
The number of oil spills since 1969 that has been over 100 tonnes in the Baltic Sea has been pretty 
steady. There are too few spills to assess any trends (see figure 6). In Estonia, there are several 
reports each year of smaller observed oil slicks, possibly from cleaning the tanks. Fortunately, these 
seem to be decreasing, with 99 in 2007, 69 in 2008, 59 in 2009 and 50 in 2010. These reports are 
not all due to actual oil spills. Several minor oil spills have been reported both at sea and in the 
rivers Elbe and Weser in Germany. There are also minor spills each year in the port  and around 
Klaipėda harbour in Lithuania. No major oil spills have been documented in Poland. Few accidents 
have been reported for the Russian Federation in the Baltic Sea, but several of the accidents in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania happened when they were part of the Soviet Union. It is also 
uncertain just how many accidents have been reported.
Figure 6: Major oil spills since 1969 in the Baltic Sea from the table above.
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Discussion
The Baltic Sea states are prepared for an oil spill. How well prepared they  are differ, however, and 
how they would respond to a larger spill is still untested. The number or amount of spills is not 
correlated to the preparedness level of the country. For example, Poland has a national contingency 
plan, despite never having an oil spill, while Sweden, who have had several, does not. Instead this is 
tied to the organisational structure of the countries and the level of autonomy that the different 
regions have.
The Deepwater Horizon event in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 clearly showed that even a country 
with a well organised response, regular exercises and well equipped and trained personnel may not 
have sufficient capability to handle an oil spill of a significant magnitude. There are no offshore 
platforms in the Baltic Sea as large as the ones in the Gulf of Mexico, but smaller ones exist. Three 
are located in Polish waters, Baltic Beta, Petro Baltic and PG-1 and one, MLSP D-6, is in Russian 
waters. They  drill in between 25 and 35 m of water and produce. The Kravtsovskoye oil well was 
discovered in 1983. The oil produced is transported via pipelines to the mainland. The Russian oil 
rig spills about 140 tonnes of oil each year and is located 22,5 kilometres from the Kaliningrad 
coastline, close to the UNESCO World Heritage site the Curonian Spit. (WWF, 2010 & offshore 
technology.com, 2011)
However, the main concern is shipping. Although the size of new tankers is increasing, these 
vessels are also modern and have highly trained crew. ITOPF statistics show that the amount of oil 
spilled from tankers is going down worldwide, but the number of oil spills from other vessels is 
increasing (see figure 7, ITOPF, 2011). Some of the larger vessels today carry more oil as fuel than 
some of the smaller tankers.
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
Figure4:ITOPFspillactivitybytankerornonͲtanker

(S11)Definitions:“nonͲtanker”,“large”/“major”
(S12)Turningnow toa fewdefinitions, justwhatare ‘nonͲtanker’sourcesofoilon theonehand,
andwhatdowemeanby‘large’or‘major’incidentsontheother?
Aninterestingplacetostartistolookat
global estimates for oil input into the
seaandworkoutwhichonesmightbe
relevant for us as ‘nonͲtanker’ sources
with emergency character, the types
thatmightresultin“major”incidents.
The Joint Group of Experts on the
Scientific Aspects of marine
Environmental Protection, also known
as “GESAMP”, has studied this and
published estimates, albeit some years
ago.

Overall,theyfoundthat44%comesfromalltypesofLandͲbaseddischarge,33%fromAtmospheric
inputs,12% fromMarineTransport, 10% fromDumpingat sea,and1% fromOilExplorationand
Production.
It is relatively easy to see that the greatest part of this oil input would not actually be from
accidentaloilspills,thetypewhichoilspillrespondersfocustheirattention.Instead,themajorityof
oilenteringtheenvironmentcomesfromchronic,nonͲpointsources.ThinkintermsofrunͲofffrom
roads, industrial effluent, air pollution and the like. These are things best dealt with through
preventiveregulation...
(S13) InordertoputourfingeronnonͲtankerthreatsofmajoroilspills, it isbesttofocusonseaͲ
basedactivitiesthathavethepotentialtoreleaselargeamountsofoilveryquickly,i.e.accidentally.
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Figure 7: Number of oil spills ITOPF has attended from tanker and non-tanker sources. (ITOPF, 2011)
With the amount of traffic in the Baltic Sea and the projections of increased traffic and more 
congested routes, the risk of an accident is increasing. The worst case scenario would be if a large 
oil tanker and a cruise ship collides in the middle of the Baltic Sea.
Several proposals for improving the safety and efficiency  f the ma ine transp rts have be n made 
and much work has been done in the last few years, for example BRISK, Baltic Master II, 
EfficienSea, Mona Lisa and other safety projects. This work can broadly be categorised into 
preventive measures and response measures. Preventive measures are measures like improving the 
traffic surveillance, increasing aerial surveillance, traffic routing and phasing out the use of single 
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hull tankers. Response measures are things like increasing the number of ships, training staff and 
buying equipment. Both categories of measures will probably have to be increased to have an 
efficient preparedness in the future.
The Baltic Sea has been fortunate to not have had any major oil spills. No rule changing accident, 
like the Torrey Canyon accident changed liability by  leading to the Civil Liability Convention 1969 
(CLC 69) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships in 1973 
(MARPOL 73), the Exxon Valdez set  a new litigation record for the time and led to the passing of 
the Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA 90) in the US. The recent Deepwater Horizon has turned out to be 
a similar wake up call for deep sea drilling, raising issues with the safety  in drilling at deeper depths 
and in increasingly hostile and sensitive environments. No such catastrophe has so far taken place 
in the Baltic Sea.
But different countries has despite this worked with contingency planning to a varying degree. 
Poland for example have had no documented larger spills at all, but have invested much time and 
money  into response preparedness. Sweden has had several smaller to medium sized spills, but 
there is large variation between the municipalities concerning the preparedness level. Different 
nations have set different goals for their oil spill response as well, for example Finland is prepared 
for an oil spill of 30 000 tonnes, Germany  for 15 000 tonnes, Sweden 10 000 tonnes and the 
Russian Federation for 5 000 tonnes. The changing risk situation in the Baltic is a good argument to 
increase this number, since larger vessels mean that an accident with a large spill is more probable 
than before, compared to the smaller vessels.
Several reports, for example the EU Maritime Spatial Planning policy (EU, 2010a), WWF Future of 
the Baltic Sea report 2010, the Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning’s 
(Boverket’s) report  2006 and the HELCOM Baltic Sea reports, acknowledge and even highlight the 
need for a holistic view to integrated coastal zone management and marine spatial planning. These 
reports would suggest a consensus on the need for this approach. The details and priorities for this 
planning, however, are quite different in the reports, but the main findings are clear: to create a 
sustainable development for the future. This includes the risks associated with the modern day of 
life, and should consequently include oil spill contingency planning. Sadly, there seem to be a lack 
of integration in oil spill contingency planning and Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM).
Increased cooperation is good and the region has held several exercises together, through 
HELCOM’s Balex Delta exercises (see figure 8) or through other agreements, for example for the 
Copenhagen agreement. However, this history  of cooperation has been focussed on the at sea 
response and little to no effort has been spent on increasing cooperation between different shoreline 
response exercises. It is only during the last  few years that shoreline response has been included on 
the agenda during the response. For the Balex Delta exercises, this was included in 2010 in Finland 
and Estonia and 2011 on Bornholm and for the Copenhagen agreement exercises during 2008 on 
Gotland, 2009 in Karlshamn, 2010 in Gothenburg and 2011 in Nynäshamn.
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Testing readiness to 
respond to oil spills
Even though a number of measures to improve 
the safety of navigation have been enforced in 
the Baltic, both initiated by HELCOM as well 
as the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), the risk of accidents can never be totally 
eliminated. Therefore, running training exercises 
is a key to efficient response preparedness.
Several kinds of exercises are conducted under 
the HELCOM flag. The most famous ones are 
the international pollution response exercises 
BALEX DELTA, started in 1990, which test the 
alarm procedures and response capacity of the 
HELCOM Member States to jointly deal with a 
major oil spill. This operational exercise which 
involves up to 20 response vessels, as well as 
helicopters and aircrafts is the largest maritime 
emergency and counter-pollution drill of its kind 
in the Baltic Sea area and one of the largest 
worldwide.
The general objective of the BALEX DELTA is 
to ensure that every HELCOM country is able to 
lead a major response operation in its response 
area. BALEX DELTA exercises take place each 
year and are hosted by the Baltic Sea countries 
according to an agreed schedule.
Host country and the number of Contracting Parties involved in BALEX DELTA exercises since 2000
2000 Russia: 
2001 Denmark: 
2002 Latvia: 
2003 Finland: 
2004 Germany:  
2005 Sweden:  
2006 Poland:  
2007 Estonia:  
2008 Russia: 
            5 countries, 12 ships, 1 aircraft
            7 countries, 11 ships, 2 aircraft
            6 countries, 18 ships, 2 aircraft
            5 countries, 16 ships
            6 countries, 11 ships, 1 aircraft 
            7 countries, 19 ships, 2 aircraft 
            7 countries and EMSA, 23 ships, 3 aircraft 
            6 countries and EMSA, 17 ships, 1 helicopter
            6 countries and EMSA, 18 ships, 2 helicopters
10
Nikolay Vlasov, HELCOM
Nikolay Vlasov, HELCOM
Nikolay Vlasov, HELCOM
Figure 8: Number of involved countries in the HELCOM Balex Delta exercises.
The trend of fewer number of observed oil spills during the aerial surveillance of the Baltic Sea 
countries is encouraging. However, these overflights are still mostly performed during daylight, and 
the drop may simply  reflect a change in behaviour of the polluters. Since only 8 cases, or 4,5 % of 
spills could be traced to a transgressor in 2009, the chance of actually  being caught and prosecuted 
for an illegal and intentional discharge is slim. (HELCOM, 2011c) The low chance of prosecution 
does not exactly discourage illegal behaviour of this kind, but seems to be working regardless.
Conclusion
There are several recommendations that could be made to increase the preparedness against  oil 
spills in the Baltic Sea. There exists a substantial preparedness for oil spill accidents in the Baltic 
Sea. However, during the course of the project, the following reflections and recommendations for 
improvements have been discussed.
The two Baltic Master projects have highlighted the changing patterns related to shipping in the 
Baltic Sea and the corresponding need to continuously re-assess the threats to coastal environments 
and communities. Oil spill contingency plans have been written and many bilateral agreements exist 
that have regular cross border exercises (Copenhagen agreement, Nordic agreement, Baltic 
Agreement, EMSA, etc). This all serves to increase the preparedness around the Baltic Sea, but 
several municipalities and areas still have a long way to go to be sufficiently prepared for an oil 
spill. It would be beneficial for these areas to build up  experience on this issue by creating and 
maintaining an oil spill contingency  plan. But to be able to have a useful plan, it needs to be tested 
and exercised regularly. USCG recommendations are a tabletop exercise once a year, which seems 
like a good idea. Such practices will test the collaboration between different agencies locally, the 
cooperation between central and local agencies, and the collaboration across borders. To help  in this 
endeavour, Baltic Master II has developed an oil spill planning guide, to help  local municipalities to 
write contingency plans and exercise them. This guide has been translated to several languages.
Since the designation of the Baltic Sea as a PSSA, traffic separation schemes and ship monitoring 
systems, for example GOFREP and BELTREP have been put in place, with a decreasing number of 
accidents in these areas as a consequence. The proven efficiency of such a system suggests that it 
would be beneficial to create a system that spans the whole of the Baltic Sea, for increased safety of 
a seafarers, the goods they carry and the environment they travel through.
32
To cover the cost for such an improved preparedness various funding mechanisms can be discussed, 
one example highlighted in the present report is the development of a fund similar to the Finnish 
model. To have a small levy on the oil being transported through the Baltic Sea, there could be 
enough funds to regularly  hold exercises, as well as periodically pay for replacement of equipment. 
The levy  itself wouldn’t have to be larger than a fraction of the amount the price of the gasoline 
changes daily  for the consumer, but would still generate enough revenue for a well equipped and 
exercised oil spill response organisation.
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Appendix 1: Contacts for the inquiry
Country Name Organisation E-mail Webpage
DK
Jesper 
Vincent
Søværnets 
Operative 
Kommando
pol.con.den@sok.dk http://forsvaret.dk/SOK
EE Silver Vahtra
Ministry of the 
Environment
silver.vahtra@envir.ee http://www.envir.ee/
EE Are Piel
Estonian Maritime 
Administration
are.piel@vta.ee http://www.vta.ee
Fi
Heli 
Haapasaari
Finnish 
Environmental 
Administration
heli.haapasaari@ymparisto.fi http://www.ymparisto.fi
LV Ojars Gerke
Latvian Coast 
Guard Service
ojars@mrcc.lv http://www.mrcc.lv
LT
Valdemaras 
Dima
Lithuanian Navy valdemaras.dima@mil.lt http://kariuomene.kam.lt
PL
Marek 
Reszko
Maritime Search 
and Rescue 
Service
marek.reszko@sar.gov.pl http://www.sar.gov.pl/
RU
Alexey 
Orekhov
Admiral Markarov 
State Maritime 
Academy
aorekhov@mtc.spb.su http://makarov.spb.ru
DE
Wolfgang 
Knopf
Haverikommando
wknopf@havariekommando.
de
http://
www.havariekommando.de
SE
Margaretha 
Ericsson
Swedish Civil 
Contingencies 
Agency
margaretha.ericsson@msb.se www.msb.se
SE Bernt Stedt
Swedish Coast 
Guard
bernt.stedt@kustbevakningen
.se
http://
www.kustbevakningen.se/
SE
Peter 
Hellberg
Swedish Maritime 
Administration
peter.hellberg@sjofartsverket.s
e
http://www.sjofartsverket.se/
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Appendix 2: Oil Spill Response Vessels in the Baltic Sea
Country Name Type Equipment
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Estonia
Estonia
A562 Mette 
Miljø
Seatruck class 
support vessel
2 x 200 m Ro-Boom
Komara skimmers
Destroil 250
Ro-Sweep boom system
Can work in gas filled environment
Storage capacity 63,8 m3
A563 Marie 
Miljø
Seatruck class 
multi-purpose 
vessel
2 x 200 m Ro-Boom
Komara skimmers
Destroil 250
Ro-Sweep boom system
Can work in gas filled environment
Storage capacity 63,8 m3
A560 Gunnar 
Thorson
Supply class multi-
purpose vessel
3 x 200 m Ro-Boom
5 x Expandi booms
Belt skimmer
Desmi Terminator
Destroil 250
Ro-Sweep boom system
Storage capacity of 311,3 m3
A561 Gunnar 
Seidenfaden
Supply class multi-
purpose vessel
3 x 200 m Ro-Boom Ocean booms
5 x Expandi booms
Belt skimmer
Desmi Terminator
Destroil 250
Ro-Sweep boom system
Storage capacity of 311,3 m3
MS201 Barge Storage capacity 300 m3
Additional room for 60 m3
MS202 Barge Storage capacity 300 m3
Additional room for 60 m3
MS203 Barge Storage capacity 300 m3
Additional room for 60 m3
Y340 Miljø 101 Oil recovery vessel Storage capacity 0,4 m3
Y341 Miljø 102 Oil recovery vessel Storage capacity 0,4 m3
Y342 Miljø 103 Oil recovery vessel 60 cm draft
Brush skimmer
Floating bag system
PVL-202 Kati Oil recovery vessel 200 m boom
Side mounted skimmers with 160 
m3/h capacity
Ice skimmer with 60 m3/h capacity
PVL-109 Valvas Oil recovery vessel 800 m boom
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Country Name Type Equipment
Estonia
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Latvia
Latvia
Latvia
Oil recovery vessel Operational in 2011
600 m boom
Side mounted skimmers with 200 
m3/h capacity
Ice skimmer with 60 m3/h capacity
Halli Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 1 400 m3
Hylje Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 800 m3
Kummeli Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 70 m3
Letto Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 43 m3
Linja Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 77 m3
Louhi Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 1 200 m3
Merikarhu Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 40 m3
Oili I Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 80 m3
Oili II Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 80 m3
Oili III Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 80 m3
Sektori Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 108 m3
Seili Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 198 m3
Svärtan Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 52 m3
Tursas Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 100 m3
Uisko Oil recovery vessel Sweeping arm system
Storage capacity 100 m3
A-90 Varonis Oil recovery vessel 2008 retrofitted Navy vessel
800 m Ro-Boom 1500
2 x Lamor OPC-4 skimmers
Floating skimmer
Desmi Terminator
Storage capacity 110 m3
KA-14-Astra Oil recovery vessel 2 x Lamor OPC-4 skimmer
JL-1 Barge Lamor OPC-4 skimmer
Desmi Terminator
Storage capacity 100 m3
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Country Name Type Equipment
Lithuania
Lithuania
Poland
Poland
Poland
Russia
Russia
Russia
Russia
Russia
German
y
German
y
German
y
MRCC Oil recovery vessel 2 x 250 m Ro-Boom 2000
Lamor Skimmer
Desmi Terminator
Dispersant spray system
Storage capacity 228 m3
4 hour deployment time
Coast Guard Oil recovery vessel Vikoma skimmer
Storage capacity 25 m3
Kapitan Poinc Oil recovery vessel 2 x 45 m Lamor arm system and 140 
m3/h capacity
900 m Ro-Boom 1500
90 m Expandi 4300 boom
Desmi Terminator skimmer with 
Scantrawl system and 100 m3/h 
capacity
Storage capacity 512 m3
Zodiac Oil recovery vessel Lamor arm and brush system
Storage capacity 2 x 36 m3
Czestaw II Oil recovery vessel 2 x Lamor arm systems and 20 m3/h 
capacity
340 m Expandi 4300 boom
Komara 12k skimmer with 12 m3/h 
capacity
Vicospray 1000 dispersant spray 
system with 4,2 m3/h capacity
Storage capacity 20 m3
Yasnyy Supply vessel 70 m3/h capacity
Storage capacity 300 m3
Topas Tug/salvage vessel 35 t pull
Storage capacity 120 m3
Kit Oil recovery vessel
Pribreshny Oil recovery vessel
Sprut-2 Barge Used in salvage operations
Arkona Multi-purpose 
vessel
2 x sweeping arm systems with 320 
m3/h capacity each
Oil separation plant
Heating system
Gas detection systems
Storage capacity 1 000 m3
Scharhörn Multi-purpose 
vessel
2 x sweeping arm systems with 320 
m3/h capacity each
Oil separation plant
Heating system
Gas detection systems
Storage capacity 430 m3
Kiel Multi-purpose 
vessel
2 x sweeping arm systems with 100 
m3/h capacity each
Oil separation plant
Storage capacity 350 m3
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Country Name Type Equipment
German
y
German
y
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Bottsand Oil recovery vessel 2 x sweeping systems with 160 m3/h 
capacity each
Oil separation plant
Storage capacity 790 m3
Vilm Oil recovery vessel 2 x sweeping arm systems with 160 
m3/h capacity each
Oil separation plant
Storage capacity 320 m3
KBV 002 Triton Multi-purpose 
vessel
Lamor system with 400 m3/h 
capacity
3 x 300 m AllMaritim NOFI boom
500 m Lamor sorbent boom
Storage capacity 1 100 m3
Oil analysis laboratory
KBV 003 
Amfitrite
Multi-purpose 
vessel
Lamor system with 400 m3/h 
capacity
500 m Lamor sorbent boom
Storage capacity 1 100 m3
Oil analysis laboratory
KBV 201 Multi-purpose 
vessel
Advancing cassette system
Storage capacity 104 m3
KBV 202 Multi-purpose 
vessel
Advancing cassette system
Storage capacity 104 m3
KBV 005 Multi-purpose 
vessel
Advancing cassette system
Skimmer
300 m boom
100 m absorbent boom
Storage capacity 233 m3
100 m3 Oilbag
10 x 1 m3 Oilbag
KBV 010 Multi-purpose 
vessel
Advancing cassette system
Skimmer
300 m boom
100 m absorbent boom
Storage capacity 212 m3
100 m3 Oilbag
10 x 1 m3 Oilbag
KBV 045 Oil recovery vessel Advancing cassette system
Skimmer
300 m boom
100 m absorbent boom
Storage capacity 150 m3
100 m3 Oilbag
10 x 1 m3 Oilbag
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Country Name Type Equipment
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
EMSA
EMSA
EMSA
KBV 046 Oil recovery vessel Advancing cassette system
Skimmer
300 m boom
100 m absorbent boom
Storage capacity 150 m3
100 m3 Oilbag
10 x 1 m3 Oilbag
KBV 047 Oil recovery vessel Advancing cassette system
Skimmer
300 m boom
100 m absorbent boom
Storage capacity 150 m3
100 m3 Oilbag
10 x 1 m3 Oilbag
KBV 866 Barge Storage capacity 440 m3
Kontio Icebreaker Two rigid sweeping arms, 12 m 
Heavy duty boom 2x250 m 
Brush skimmer 
Oil slick detection system
Storage capacity 2 003 m3
Aalborg Tanker Two flexible sweeping arms, 15,6 m 
Single point inflation boom 400 m 
Brush Skimmer; 2 x Arctic skimmers
Oil slick detection system
Storage capacity 4 487 m3
Copenhagen Tanker Two flexible sweeping arms, 15,6 m 
Single point inflation boom 400 m 
Brush Skimmer; 2 x Arctic skimmers
Oil slick detection system
Storage capacity 4 487 m3
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